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TRANSNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW: CO-REGULATION 
OF B2C-E-COMMERCE 
Gralf-Peter Calliess∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A central function of private law is to facilitate market exchange by 
enabling economic actors to conciliate their mutual expectations 
and, thus, to cooperate. This coordinative function of private law 
becomes manifest in the definition of property rights and the 
enforcement of contractual obligations. Since the principle of party 
autonomy leaves the decision on substantive issues to contractual 
self-regulation, private law in this respect is merely a public 
framework for private ordering. In the modern welfare state, 
however, private law also fulfils a regulatory function in establishing 
certain constraints to party autonomy with respect to commutative 
justice and public policy. The legislation on the protection of 
consumers, as the weaker party in business transactions, figures as 
a prominent example (Grundmann, Kerber, and Weatherill, 2001). 
While consumer protection within domestic markets is a well-
established concept, the same does not hold for the international 
realm, where the enforcement of national protection regimes is 
hampered by a lack of international cooperation. Until recently this 
has posed not much of a problem, since consumers rarely engaged 
in international commerce directly. With the advent of the Internet, 
however, matters have changed dramatically. In the networked 
∗ Dr. jur., Professor for International and European Private Law, Ludwig 
Maximilians University Munich. This paper was produced during my stay as a 
visiting researcher at the CRC 597 “Transformations of the State” at the 
University of Bremen in summer 2006. I wish to thank Harry Bauer for his help 
in translating substantial parts of this paper into the English language and 
Martin Klamt for editing. 
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economy, consumers increasingly shop online often without 
noticing that they get involved in cross-border situations, in which 
businesses are able to contract around national consumer rights by 
means of forum shopping and choice of law (Rothchild, 1999: 893; 
Calliess, 2006: ch 2-3).  
It has been in this context that the issue of consumer confidence in 
business to consumer electronic commerce ('b2c-e-commerce') 
entered the global agenda (European Commission, 1997; Federal 
Trade Commission, 2000; OECD, 2006a). While states remained 
reluctant to regulate cross-border consumer contracts by means of 
multilateral treaties, international organisations called for co-
regulatory efforts in addressing the issue. Hence, the 1999 OECD 
Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic 
Commerce (the 'OECD Guidelines’) read: 
'Part II, VI: B.: Businesses, consumer representatives and 
governments should work together to continue to use 
and develop fair, effective and transparent self-
regulatory and other policies and procedures, including 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, to address 
consumer complaints and to resolve consumer disputes 
arising from business-to-consumer electronic commerce, 
with special attention to cross-border transactions. […] 
Part III: To achieve the purpose of this Recommendation, 
Member countries should […] encourage continued 
private sector leadership that includes the participation 
of consumer representatives in the development of 
effective self-regulatory mechanisms that contain 
2007] TRANSNATIONAL CONSUMER LAW 3 
specific, substantive rules for dispute resolution and 
compliance mechanisms.'1 (see also OECD, 2002) 
It is widely accepted that international merchants are able to solve 
their coordination problems by means of private ordering and, 
therefore, that they should be allowed to opt out of the state’s legal 
system in handing over disputes to arbitration under the law 
merchant (Berger, 1999; Zumbansen, 2002; general critique at 
Cutler, 2003). This assumption's underlying rationale is that there is 
an absence of public interest in international commerce as 
merchants presumably meet on an equal footing. Regarding 
consumer contracts, in turn, private ordering is generally not 
thought to be an effective and legitimate means for achieving the 
regulatory functions of private law (Hadfield 2001: 45; European 
Consumer Law Group, 2001). Thus, the interesting question arises 
what the concept of co-regulation promoted by the OECD exactly 
entails, and whether it could at all work in the context of b2c-e-
commerce. 
In the following, I intend to examine the potential role of private 
ordering and co-regulation in the area of cross-border consumer 
contracts. I start with a survey of the different mechanisms of 
private ordering, which have developed in e-commerce (I.). This 
illustrates that electronic market places fulfil an essential role in 
bundling different means of private ordering into what I call 
transnational civil regimes for consumer protection (II.). Finally, I aim 
at demonstrating how states, industry, and civil society actors can 
jointly contribute to the establishment of a civil constitution for such 
regimes with respect to the regulatory functions of private law 
(III.). 
1 The Guidelines are available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf. (All links to the Internet 
in this text are last checked on 20 January 2007.) 
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II. PRIVATE ORDERING IN B2C-E-COMMERCE 
There is a plethora of literature on private ordering in commercial 
relations, describing various governance mechanisms that 
merchants employ in order to reduce the likelihood of 
opportunistic behaviour among contractual parties (Bernstein, 
1992; Benson, 1999; Aviram, 2004; Williamson, 2005; Greif, 2006). 
These mechanisms are generally applied 'in the shadow of law', but 
their use is rendered essential in a situation of 'lawlessness', eg, in 
low developed countries with inefficient legal systems (Dixit, 2004). 
The latter situation resembles the one in cross-border commerce in 
which businesses are confronted with constitutional uncertainties 
resulting from multi-jurisdictional litigation (Schmidtchen, 1990; 
Streit and Mangels, 1996). In this part of my paper I intend to 
demonstrate, how the governance mechanisms employed by 
international merchants are increasingly adapted to b2c-e-
commerce transactions as well. 
A. ONLINE REPUTATION 
One important mechanism of contractual governance is reputation: 
people do not engage in opportunistic behaviour in a certain 
transaction, because they fear that other parties might refrain from 
entering into future transactions with partners which on the 
relevant market have a reputation as bad co-operators (Posner, 
2000). But the collection and processing of information on the past 
performance of potential contract partners is costly, since it usually 
is not spread in an organized manner but rather spontaneously. For 
this reason the reputation mechanism is categorized as 'informal 
third-party control' (Panther, 2000). It follows, that the reputation 
mechanism works most effectively for high volume transactions 
which legitimize the involved information costs as well as on 
markets with a limited number of players which interact frequently 
and, thus, have a high probability of meeting repeatedly (Leeson, 
forthcoming). The interactive communication capabilities of the 
Internet, however, have enabled the establishment of large-scale, 
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'word-of-mouth'-networks at low cost. Online feedback 
mechanisms introduced by electronic market places have led to an 
increasing formalisation of the reputation mechanism (Dellarocas, 
2003: 1407). In the following, I shall discuss the 'eBay'-feedback 
system as an example for the adaptation of the reputation 
mechanism to the needs of large scale and small volume consumer 
markets with a low probability of repeated transactions (Baron, 
2002; Resnick et al., 2006). 
In order to enter 'eBay's' electronic market place, seller and buyer 
first have to become registered members. 'eBay' offers different 
procedures for identity check, where the appliance of the most 
rigorous check is indicated by a symbol attached to the member's 
name. In the aftermath of every transaction, buyer and seller can 
mutually assess each other—positively, neutral or negatively—and 
can briefly justify their decision. Negative assessments can be 
commented on by the assessed and are allowed to be taken back by 
mutual agreement. In this way, multiple assessments constitute a 
rating profile of every member, the quality of which is indicated 
after the member's name by stars and shooting stars in different 
colorings. This allows potential transaction partners to get 
information about each other before completion of a contract.2 
Furthermore, those vendors receive the status of a 'PowerSeller' 
who on average have sold more than 300 items within the last three 
months or who have generated a turnover of 3,000 Euro and whose 
ratings are positive to more than 98 percent. Again, this is indicated 
by a particular symbol after the member's name. New members 
and those members who have changed their member name are also 
indicated by particular symbols. In sum, 'eBay' provides a highly 
formalized reputation system, which offers its members a high 
                                                 
2  In principle, this only applies to the buyer, as the vendor cannot know 
the winner of an auction in advance. Recently, however, eBay has provided 
sellers with the option of limiting their offer to buyers from a particular region or 
with a particular minimum rating profile. 
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degree of transparency through information about the 
trustworthiness of potential contractual partners. Shopping with a 
commercial 'PowerSeller' can be considered as safe as shopping 
with a traditional high street brand like Marks and Spencer for 
example. Yet, occasional private sellers can also obtain an 
impeccable reputation over a longer period of time. In contrast, it is 
more risky to complete a contract with a new vendor lacking a 
distinct member profile. In such a case, every member has to 
consider whether she wants to take such a risk; especially, if higher 
sums of money are involved, additional precautionary measures 
are available such as an escrow service, which is further detailed 
below. 
B. TRUSTMARKS AND CODES OF CONDUCT 
Following the principle 'caveat emptor', trustmarks offer a 
functional equivalent to trademarks in that both bundle 
information on a supplier in an easily accessible form and, thus, 
replace for individual investigations into its reputation. Trustmarks 
are of special importance to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs) which are unable to build up their own trademark on the 
global electronic market place. They are awarded to vendors by a 
neutral third party, given that specific criteria prescribed in a code 
of conduct have been met (for the distinction of 'trust' in a vendor 
and 'reliance' on an independent third party see Pichler, 2000). 
Originally, trustmarks were awarded to products with regard to 
their technical standard. In principle, trustmarks can also be used to 
establish socio-ethical standards or to secure compliance with legal 
norms. Private, state and hybrid institutions can play a crucial part 
in their award and monitoring. Businesses voluntarily submit 
themselves to such standards and monitoring as they hope to gain 
competitive advantages through the trustmark. The German 'blue 
angel' and the European 'eco-label' applied such a conception to 
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environmental standards (cf. Teubner, Farmer, and Murphy, 1994; 
Pfaff and Sanchirico, 2000: 189).3 In the debate over Internet 
governance, such trustmarks are discussed as a means for the 
protection of privacy, consumers, and children (Wagemans, 2003; 
Spletter, 2003). 
Following the Internet euphoria of the late nineties, in b2c-e-
commerce numerous trustmark schemes have been established, but 
only a few of those have achieved some significance in the market 
place (see GBDE, 2000; see also Nordquist, Andersson, and 
Dzepina, 2002). Particularly successful has been the 'BBBOnLine 
Reliability Seal', which following an initiative by the Canadian and 
US-American Chambers of Commerce is used by almost 20,000 web 
pages.4 In order to obtain the seal, an Internet vendor has among 
other things to become a member of the 'Better Business Bureau' 
(BBB) located at the headquarters of her business, he has to follow 
the 'BBB Code of Online Business Practices'5 based on the 'OECD 
Guidelines' and she has to subject herself to an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure that accords with BBB's fairness criteria.6 To 
give an example, a pre-dispute, binding arbitration clause in a 
contract is only admissible, if the consumer has been fully informed 
about its consequences and costs, provided that the consumer signs 
                                                 
3  Cf. http://blauer-engel.de and http://www.eco-label.com/german/; for 
a survey of environmental trustmarks see www.label-online.de.  
4  See http://www.bbbonline.org/consumer  
5 Available at: 
http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/code/CodeEnglish.doc 
6  'To agree to participate in binding arbitration under BBB Rules of 
Arbitration (Binding) if the consumer also agrees, or in non-binding informal 
dispute settlement (IDS) under the BBB Rules for IDS for unresolved consumer 
complaints involving Participant's products or services. Alternatively, a 
company may pre-commit to a dispute settlement process through a provider 
other than the BBB, if the BBB determines the dispute settlement process 
substantially complies with BBB consumer dispute resolution criteria.”, available 
at: http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/dr.asp.  
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the clause separately and that such acceptance is not a precondition 
for the transaction itself.7  
With more than 1500 certified traders the private company 'Trusted 
Shops' is one of the leading providers of trustmarks in Europe.8 
Participating traders have to meet certification criteria, which 
follow current German and European legal regulations in the field 
of distant selling and electronic commerce.9 Furthermore, 'Trusted 
Shops' assessment encompasses credit ratings, safety technology, 
transparency of prices, costumer services and privacy issues. In 
collaboration with the credit insurer 'Atradius', 'Trusted Shops' 
additionally offers a money-back guarantee covering failed 
delivery, failed refund after return, and credit card fraud, which is 
free of cost to buyers. Moreover, 'Trusted Shops' provides a central 
customer service and dispute resolution procedure. Customers can 
contact a multilingual service centre with any arising issue via 
phone, email or Internet. According to 'Trusted Shops', thus far 
there has been not a single court case filed between a customer and 
an online shop because of the mediation procedures in place. 
Certification criteria are continuously revised in collaboration with 
an advisory board encompassing among others members of 
consumer protection agencies and academics. Participating vendors 
are informed about new developments in law. All online shops can 
be accessed via a central portal, which consumers can use to search 
                                                 
7  'In order to ensure that the consumer has knowingly chosen arbitration 
as the method of resolving disputes covered by the arbitration clause, binding 
arbitration clauses must contain the following: A separate signature line, 
appearing immediately below the arbitration clause, for the consumer to sign to 
acknowledge acceptance of the terms of the arbitration clause; and, a statement 
that the consumer will not be bound by the terms of the clause unless the 
consumer signs on the signature line.’: 
http://www.bbbonline.org/reliability/dr.asp.  
8  For the following see: 
http://www.trustedshops.com/en/trustedshops/index.html.  
9  http://www.trustedshops.com/en/shops/obligations_en.html   
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for particular goods. For all mentioned services vendors pay 
graded fees according to their turnover. Additionally, for their 
online shops and advertising campaigns vendors are offered pre-
certified web hosting and software solutions. Although also big 
brands like 'Aral', 'Dell', 'Dorint', etc. have joined; 'Trusted Shops' 
remains committed to be a platform that especially allows SMEs to 
access e-commerce. 
This example highlights that trustmark providers can generate a 
realm of private order, which rests not only on norms as part of 
codes of conduct but also on a combination of an insurance for filed 
payment and alternative dispute resolution procedures. Such an 
arrangement increases the security level to such an extent that e-
shopping is rendered more reliable than traditional brick and 
mortar business dealings, in which customers have to assert their 
legal rights in court and in which they carry the risk of insolvency. 
The withdrawal of the trustmark itself works as a powerful 
sanction mechanism. The severity of such a sanction as well as the 
credibility of its threat, however, depends on the success of the 
trustmark provider: only if the trustmark has gained some weight 
within the market place can its withdrawal pose a serious 
competitive disadvantage to vendors. At the same time, only an 
economically successful trustmark provider can afford to lose 
vendors as clients. The success of trustmarks depends on three 
decisive factors usually termed as 'critical mass, financial 
sustainability, and branding' (Wagemans, 2003: 14). As mechanisms 
of private ordering trustmarks are network goods by nature 
(Aviram, 2003). This is the reason why international cooperation 
between trustmark schemes and both the interlinking with (eg, 
market places, ADR) and the embedding in already existing 
mechanisms of self-regulation (eg, Chamber of Commerce) seems 
particularly apposite. 
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C.  ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The notion that the Internet's communicative potential can be used 
to establish alternative forms of dispute resolution procedures 
dates back to the mid-1990s (Post, 1995; Karamon, 1996: 537; Cona, 
1997: 975; Eisen, 1998: 1305; Almaguer and Baggot, 1998: 711; 
Bordone, 1998: 175; Perritt, 2000: 675). The term 'online dispute 
resolution' (ODR) covers on the one hand conflicts arising from the 
use of the Internet itself, such as disputes over domain names or e-
commerce transactions, on the other hand services of alternative 
dispute resolution provided via the Internet (eADR) (Hörnle, 2001; 
Teitz, 2001: 990; Schultz, 2004: 71; Ponte, 2004). The latter includes 
the whole range of traditional ADR procedures - informal assisted 
negotiation, mediation, and formal arbitration - in so far as the 
involved parties and a neutral third party communicate via email 
or via password protected web pages, they electronically exchange 
documents and photographs ('written proceedings'), and they even 
negotiate simultaneously in chat-rooms, via phone or in 
videoconferences ('quasi hearings') (Krause, 2001: 457, 460). The 
kind and extent of the use of information and communication 
technology not only depends on its spread among potential users 
but also on the aim and kind of dispute resolution procedure. 
When, for example, in international commercial arbitration the 
formal requirements of the 1958 New York Convention are of 
concern, high technical standards are necessary, while in more 
informal dispute resolution procedures easily accessible, timely 
and inexpensive solutions are required (Hörnle, 2003). 
Moreover, software supported negotiation systems allow parties to 
settle disputes without involvement of a neutral third party 
(Lodder and Thiessen, 2003). Thus, based on game theoretical 
premises automatic negotiation systems are offered for those 
conflicts in which solely the amount of a sum is disputed, such as in 
insurance cases. Within a 'blind bidding'-procedure, the parties 
submit their offer for a settlement within a number of rounds; yet, 
their offer remains unknown to the opposite party. Then, computer 
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software fixes a binding sum for the settlement based on the 
arithmetic mean of all offers and given that the final sum remains 
within a certain range, eg, a difference of 30 percent (see the survey 
of providers in Tyler and Bretherton, 2003). Besides, systems exist 
that provide parties with a password-protected space for 
negotiation. Via menu-driven input masks, they allow parties to 
closer define the object of dispute, to fix their aims, to deduce the 
willingness to compromise and to reach voluntary settlement by 
standardized information about possible ways to resolution.10 
Hence, ODR can be distinguished from more traditional 
procedures of ADR in that technology takes part as a 'fourth party' 
(Katsh and Rifkin, 2001: 93; Lodder and Thiessen, 2003). 
A study by the Australian ministry of justice dating back to 2003 
examined 76 ODR web pages worldwide; 42 of which were 
established in the years 1999/2000 and 19 of which had already 
ceased to provide their services (Tyler and Bretherton, 2003: 5; 
updated Tyler, 2004). Only 24 providers submitted information 
concerning the number of cases dealt with, only eight web pages 
contained statistical information about achieved results (Tyler and 
Bretherton, 2003: 9). One can assume that those providers that did 
not present any information were not particularly successful 
(Schultz, Kaufmann-Kohler, Langer, and Bonnet, 2001: 67; 
Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz, 2004). Among the more successful 
providers are especially those ODR pages which are linked to a 
market place for e-commerce or which are run by a Chamber of 
Commerce or an industry association. The reason for such success 
may lie in the fact that those pages are easily accessible via the 
market place or the vendor's web page, that they are partly 
advertised by a trustmark and that they can be used for free or for a 
minimal charge due to subsidies by the operators of market places 
and by subscription (Tyler and Bretherton, 2003: 11). 
                                                 
10  For www.smartsettle.com's offer see Lodder and Thiessen, 2003: 5. 
12 CLPE RESEARCH PAPER SERIES [VOL. 03 NO. 03 
 
In the following, I introduce the most successful ODR model in the 
area of b2c-e-commerce (cf. Hörnle, 2002). 'SquareTrade' is a private 
company with its headquarters in San Francisco. Since February 
2000, it has dealt with over one million conflicts linked to 120 
countries in five languages. This renders 'SquareTrade' market 
leader for those ODR services dealing with transactions at 
electronic market places.11 The dispute resolution procedure is 
arranged in two phases. At the first level, direct negotiations 
between the involved parties take place via a secure web page. 
Communication is organized via interactive input masks, which are 
constantly revised and improved in the face of new experiences 
(software facilitated direct negotiations). In a majority of cases, the 
involved parties come to a settlement themselves. If this cannot be 
achieved, each party can call in a mediator at the second level of the 
procedure. Based on electronic documentation, the mediator is able 
to quickly gain an overview of the conflict and to support the 
parties in their quest for a settlement. Following the party's request, 
she can even make a non-binding suggestion for a settlement 
(online mediation). Overall, 80 percent of cases can be resolved by a 
conjoint settlement, which is obeyed in 98 percent of cases. The 
average duration of a procedure is two weeks. 
Based on a cooperation agreement with 'eBay', for 'eBay'-members 
direct negotiations at 'SquareTrade' are free of charge; the 
involvement of a mediator is only 20 US dollars. The 'SquareTrade'-
ODR service is easily accessible via links at the 'eBay'-web page. 
Furthermore, for an annual charge 'SquareTrade' offers a trustmark 
that vendors can bear given that their identity and reliability has 
been established by 'SquareTrade' and that they subscribe to the 
'SquareTrade Selling and Customer Services Standards', which 
especially demand compromise oriented participation in 
'SquareTrade'-ODR procedures as well as strict compliance with 
                                                 
11  For the offer of www.squaretrade.com see the presentation of its 
President & CEO (Abernethy, 2003).  
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settlements achieved there. The high levels of settlement and 
compliance achieved within 'eBay' can be explained by the 
impending withdrawal of the trustmark and deterioration of 'eBay'-
ratings. As 'eBay'-vendors heavily rely on their reputation via 
'SquareTrade' they can also render (unjustified) negative customer 
ratings objects of dispute. If both parties agree to withdraw a 
negative rating within the 'SquareTrade'-procedure, the rating is 
not erased from the 'eBay'-member profile, yet it does not remain 
part of the 'PowerSeller'-rating, the highest category of which 
requires 98 percent of positive ratings. 
One can record that the success of ODR procedures depends not 
only on the provision of easy accessible, quick, effective and low-
cost dispute resolution, but as well on linkages with heavily used 
market places and with other services providing private order. The 
example of 'SquareTrade' proves that cost-effective ODR 
procedures—even covering cross-border transactions—can be 
organized and are affordable for low volume mass market 
transactions. 'SquareTrade' has succeeded in integrating its offer to 
the primary markets for e-commerce, where online disputes evolve. 
This integration is brought about by a cooperation agreement with 
the primary market maker 'eBay', and by creating socio-legal bonds 
for potential dispute parties to commit to the process.12 The 
'SquareTrade' mediation process is mandatory to those eBay-
sellers, which committed to the trustmark scheme. In addition, the 
commitment of parties to the process is streamlined by the 
potential repercussions with the eBay feedback system. 
                                                 
12  The term 'legal bond' being used in a very broad sense, including not 
only contractual design but also all kinds of 'private ordering' (see Mifsud 
Bonnici and de Vey Mestdagh, 2005: 31-42). 
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D. METHOD OF PAYMENT AND CREDIT SECURITY 
In the context of private ordering in e-commerce, the role of 
payment service providers as trusted third parties is of interest. From 
international commerce it is known that mechanisms such as letters 
of credit, factoring, forfeiting and credit insurance play a major role 
in the cushioning of those risks arising out of the consecutive 
exchange of goods and services (Häberle, 2002). In b2c-e-commerce 
a number of models have been developed which facilitate 
consumers to carry the burden of the usually required advance 
payments. These are introduced in the following. More advanced 
'real time e-payment'-technologies aiming at the simultaneous 
exchange of services and payments in direct e-commerce with 
digitized goods remain very much in the future.13 
In b2c-e-commerce payment by credit card is most common 
(Federal Trade Commission, 2003; cf. OECD, 2006b).14 Against 
widespread fear concerning credit card fraud on the Internet, for 
consumers this method of payment is the most secure as payments 
in e-commerce requires credit card number and period of validity 
but no signature of the credit card holder.15 Hence, consumers can 
object to transactions with the bank issuing their credit card within 
six weeks after receipt of the credit card statement. According to 
the so-called 'credit card charge back'-procedure, the vendor has to 
                                                 
13  For the transfer of a 'delivery vs. payment'-system, well-known from 
stock market clearings, to b2c-e-commerce see European Central Bank, 2004.  
14  Visa is used more often than any other card regarding online shopping, 
see: http://www.visaeurope.com/personal/onlineshopping/main.jsp 
15  Cf. for the German legal situation Meder, 2002. Implementing Art. 8 
Distant Selling Directive (97/7/EC), § 676 h BGB only provides a clarification. In 
praxis the allocation of the burden of proof is decisive. Apart from a given 
signature, prima facie evidence—that the consumer has handled the transaction 
herself or has not carefully treated his PIN—only exists in the case of the PIN-
procedure, see the German ‘Bundesgerichtshof’, Judgement of 5 October 2004 (XI 
ZR 210/03): http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20040285.htm  
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prove that the payment has taken place with consent of the credit 
card holder. Due to the lack of the consumer's signature, this can 
only be successful if the vendor can prove that he has delivered 
goods to the consumer and that the consumer has indeed ordered 
these goods. Failing such proof, eg because the consumer claims 
not to have taken the order, the paid purchase price is refunded 
and the vendor is subject to a hefty charge. In this way, banks have 
completely passed on the risks of online fraud to online vendors. 
Yet, due to possible abuse through unjustified complaints, in the 
meantime online vendors have been offered rating systems for 
credit card customers in order to identify in advance those 
consumers marked by numerous charge backs. Somewhat 
misleadingly termed as consumer protection, yet indeed probably 
more used to protect vendors, Visa now offers 'Verified by Visa', a 
system that provides registered customers with an additional 
password and which allows identifying the customer via a secure 
'Visa'-server. Hence, customers cannot claim anymore that they 
have not ordered a particular good or service.16 
In the debate on self-regulation in b2c-e-commerce, credit card 
issuers have early been discussed as playing an important role in 
providing effective redress to consumers, since via the 'charge 
back'-procedure they could enforce decisions issued by ODR 
service providers (Perritt, 2000; ABA, 2002). Yet, this would mean 
that credit card suppliers either provide fair ODR procedures 
themselves or cooperate with an established ODR provider in this 
respect, neither of which is the case. In fact, current 'charge back'-
procedures are relatively unfair since vendors are unlikely to 
succeed in a complaints procedure given the form of evidence 
necessary plus they have to carry high costs. Moreover, a fair 
'charge back'-procedure should not only cover the absence of card 
                                                 
16 
http://www.visaeurope.com/merchant/handlingvisapayments/cardnotpresent
/verifiedbyvisa.jsp  
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holder authorisation ('I did not do it') but also include other 
frequently raised complaints, such as 'I did not receive it', 'item not 
as described', 'item defective', as well as the refund of the purchase 
price in case of withdrawal and return. In this regard, however, the 
legal situation differs from country to country: whereas such 
complaints are ruled out in France, consumers in the US enjoy such 
rights under the 'Fair Credit Billing Act'. In other countries, the 
right to complain is stipulated by credit card agreements with the 
issuing bank; hence, it remains at the bank's discretion whether it 
further pursues complaints, which are foreseen in the international 
'charge back'-rules of credit card issuers (European Commission, 
2000; OECD, 2006b: 19). Finally, the credit card system is unsuitable 
for small value transactions due to its tariff scale.  
'E-payment'-service providers like 'PayPal' take advantage of this 
gap.17 'PayPal' offers to its 56 million users a system of payment 
that allows transferring money to people in 45 countries provided 
they have an email address. The system requires opening a 
password protected 'PayPal'-account, to which money can be 
transferred or for which a direct debit agreement can be authorized. 
In a protected procedure money can then be transferred via email. 
The transferred amount is credited to the recipient's 'PayPal'-
account, which can be opened free of charge even after receipt of 
the email transfer. Credit can be transferred to a bank account at 
every time. This standard service is for both parties free of charge, 
yet there is no pay of interest on credit. 'PayPal' offers special 
accounts for companies that allow accepting credit card payments 
via 'PayPal', even if the vendor does not participate in the credit 
card system. Since 'PayPal' has been acquired by 'eBay' in 2002, 
'PayPal' offers a special service for 'eBay'-auctions. For 'eBay'-
buyers, who pay via 'PayPal', a money-back guarantee takes effect 
in cases where goods are 'not received or significantly not as 
                                                 
17  www.paypal.com  
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described' up to a value of 1,000 US dollars; for transactions not 
covered, 'PayPal' provides a 'Buyer Complaint Process' in order to 
solve complaints. Additionally, 'PayPal' offers support for 
companies both in averting 'credit card charge backs' and by 
providing a 'seller protection policy', which covers losses up to 
5,000 US dollars provided that the vendor carefully follows 
particular standards. In the context of settling disputed 
transactions, 'PayPal' follows a rigid policy of freezing affected 
credit. Together with 'PayPal's' partly limited attainability, this has 
led to criticism from companies and customers alike.18 
Finally, comparable to a letter of credit 'Escrow.com' offers an 
online escrow service, the use of which is recommended to 
customers by 'eBay' for transactions involving higher sums and 
unknown contractual partners.19 At first, buyer and seller register 
via 'Escrow.com's' protected web page and then have  to specify 
their terms of trade, among those a detailed description of the 
merchandize, of its price, of the method and insurance of delivery, 
of the way to carry costs and of the period in which the buyer has 
the right to return the good. Then the buyer deposits the purchase 
price in an escrow account, 'Escrow.com' informs the vendor about 
payment receipt, which causes the vendor to dispatch the ordered 
good in a way that allows proof of delivery (eg, UPS). If the time 
allowed returning the good passes without the buyer's complaint, 
the purchase price is paid out to the vendor. In case the buyer does 
not want to keep the good, she returns it and gets back the 
purchase price (less 0.85 percent as escrow charge) and dispatch 
costs according to previous agreement, provided that within a 
                                                 
18  See the critical web pages www.paypalsucks.com and 
www.paypalwarning.com where vendors complain that 'PayPal' would 
deliberately delay complaints for months in order to benefit from the interest for 
blocked credits. Whereas consumers claim that PayPal would like to withdraw 
their right to the 'credit card charge back'-procedure. 
19  www.escrow.com; see also the 'Safe Trade program' by www.iloxx.de.  
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specified period the vendor has not objected to the return of the 
good. In the latter case, the purchase price remains with 
'Escrow.com' without interest pay until buyer and seller have come 
to a mutual agreement. According to 'Escrow.com's' terms of trade, 
after 60 days the matter is passed on to the 'American Arbitration 
Association' (AAA) in order to come to a binding decision. In the 
meantime, the involved parties are free to turn, for instance, to 
'SquareTrade' in order to find an amicable solution, yet 
'Escrow.com' does not provide any binding rules concerning this 
procedure. 
III. CONSUMER PROTECTING CIVIL REGIMES: THE 
ROLE OF VIRTUAL MARKET PLACES 
The above survey of self-regulation in the global electronic market 
place has demonstrated that mechanisms of contractual governance 
ranging from reputation and the involvement of trustworthy third 
parties as intermediaries to alternative dispute resolution - all of 
which are well known from the debates on private ordering in 
international commerce - have been refined and adapted in order to 
be used as well in the field of b2c-e-commerce; here commercial 
providers of ordering services have especially been successful. Yet, 
each of the introduced services alone leaves a number of problems 
unattended. If problems arise after a transaction was entered into, it 
is hardly of use that the contractual partner has carefully been 
chosen on the basis of his reputation according to an individual 
rating system or her participation in a trustmark scheme. The 
handling of payments by an escrow service leads to no solution eg 
in case of a disputed withdrawal, where it remains unclear in 
which procedure the dispute should be settled. For often after 
dispute has arisen, the involved parties are unable to agree on a 
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particular procedure.20 Similarly, an ODR procedure is of no use, if 
its result is not implemented by the involved parties due to the 
impending loss of reputation or with the help of a payment service. 
Opportunistic behaviour can occur not only in the parties' direct 
contractual relationship, but also in the context of private ordering 
services offered by third parties. Eg a vendor might not only fail to 
perform as contractually promised, but he might in addition fail to 
respond to a claim brought in an ODR procedure, or he might fail 
to abide to a mutual agreement found in such ODR procedure. 
However, the efficacy of private ordering can be enhanced by 
combining different governance mechanisms, especially if it is 
agreed upon in advance which authority to turn to in case of a 
dispute and if the parties' use of ODR procedures can be linked 
back to online reputation systems on the primary markets. 
Negative ratings are then not only given to sellers who deliver low-
quality goods or to buyers who fail to pay, but also to those who 
behave uncooperatively in mediation, who do not follow 
settlements agreed on, or who evade an ongoing ODR procedure of 
an 'e-payment' provider via a parallel 'credit card charge back', etc. 
In international commerce, the necessary interlinking of different 
private ordering services regularly occurs in relation to an 
individual transaction. Of course one can find standardized 
contract clauses such as the 'Incoterms' of the International 
                                                 
20  See a Statement of the General Counsel of the American Arbitration 
Association, Ms. Peterson, available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65871.000/hju65871_0.H
TM: 'About 95 percent of the arbitrations that come to the Association result from 
pre-dispute arbitration clauses. Our 75 years of experience indicates that at the 
time a dispute arises people can't agree on anything. … So the choice before this 
committee is not pre-dispute or post-dispute, it is pre-dispute or litigation, 
because our experience shows that post-dispute arbitration is something that 
people won't agree to.'; the same is reported by the CEO of 'SquareTrade' 
(Abernethy, 2003: 8). 
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Chamber of Commerce, standard forms for different arrangements 
concerning letters of credit, and model arbitration clauses 
referencing the rules of certain arbitration institutions. Yet these are 
individually tailored by international law firms into a contractual 
regime as complete as possible. In consumer markets, in turn, there 
is a higher need for standardisation, which is usually satisfied by 
companies' general business terms. Due to their unilateral 
imposition on customers, however, such terms and conditions are 
hardly suitable to achieve a satisfactory level of consumer 
protection. In the domestic context, this is the rationale of state 
intervention through coercive consumer protection laws and 
judicial review. Similarly, in global b2c-e-commerce there exists a 
demand for a neutral third party that could standardize private 
ordering services and tie them into effective civil regimes. 
In this context, operators of virtual market places perform an 
important function. For even more than medieval harbours, fairs 
and market places, operators of electronic market places stand in 
international competition for suppliers and consumers. In order to 
attract turnover, it is not only necessary to provide efficient 
technical infrastructure, but also to establish a 'safe harbour'-policy, 
which strengthens the trust of potential customers into the fairness 
of transactions handled at the market place. As international stock 
markets offer additional services for the handling of transactions 
(clearing) and try to establish standards of transparency and 
investor protection transcending legal minimum requirements, 
(Adolff, 2003: 61-91; Damrau, 2003) operators of virtual market 
places make an effort to establish a market order that both fosters 
consumer trust and satisfies the needs of small and medium 
enterprises. 
Founded 1995 in California, 'eBay' has developed from an 
electronic advertisement section via a platform for online auctions 
into the currently most popular site for Internet business between 
costumers and especially small businesses. It encompasses more 
than 100 million registered users throughout the world and 24 
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localized web pages ('the world's online marketplace').21 In order to 
increase the attractiveness of the market place, 'eBay' fosters the 
public spirit among its users, which leads to the emergence of a 
private market order.22 As a virtual market place is a network good, 
the benefit of which increases with the number of participants, the 
level of regulation has only slowly been increased reflecting 
costumers' needs and numbers (Baron, 2002). As already presented, 
the core of this market order is a rating system, which has been 
developed further by the introduction of star ratings and trust 
symbols. Through cooperation with the ODR provider 
'SquareTrade' and escrow services23 as well as the buying up of the 
payment service provider 'PayPal', it has been embedded in a 
network of private services providing order.24 As an additional 
service 'eBay' offers security tips to buyers and sellers with special 
attention given to international transactions.25 
'eBay's' market order is based on the 'user agreement' and a number 
of additional 'policies', which regulate the behaviour of members at 
                                                 
21 
 http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/thecompany/companyoverview.ht
ml: Currently, ‘with millions of buyers and sellers worldwide, eBay offers 
localized sites in the following markets’: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. ‘In addition, eBay has a presence in Latin America through its investment 
MercadoLibre.com.’ 
22  http://pages.ebay.com/aboutebay/community.html  
23  Eg eBay Germany cooperates with the escrow service 'iloxx Safetrade': 
www.iloxx.de.  
24  http://pages.ebay.com/securitycenter/  
25 
 http://offer.ebay.com/ws/eBayISAPI.dll?GlobalTradeHub&hubType=0
.  
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the market place and their relationship with 'eBay' itself.26 These 
detailed rules are centrally laid down by 'eBay', yet they root in 
closely observed customer habits at the market place. They are 
constantly revised both in exchange with members of 'eBay'-fora 
and as reaction to arising issues becoming evident through the 
offered protection programs for buyers and sellers. 'SquareTrade' 
also contributes to norm development at the market place. 
Although 'SquareTrade'-mediators issue no rulings the ratio 
decidendi of which could work as foundation for a precedent, they 
do not act arbitrarily but on the basis of those experiences gained in 
handling countless 'eBay'-disputes. From these standardized 
solutions for repeated conflicts, certain patterns develop that 
'SquareTrade' includes in its menu-driven software for direct 
negotiations between parties (Abernethy, 2003: 5). As sanction for 
norm violations, the online reputation mechanism is available 
(informal third-party-control). This mechanism is fostered by 'eBay' 
via the introduction of a new option for sellers: 'buyer-
requirements'.27 Accordingly, buyers can be excluded who have a 
negative assessment, frequent 'item not paid'-warnings28 or no 
'PayPal'-account.29 On the other hand, 'eBay' itself has the 
possibility of punishing violations of the market order by imposing 
                                                 
26  http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies: 1. Rules for Buyers, 2. Rules for 
Sellers, 3. Rules for Everyone, 4. Prohibited and Restricted Items, 5. Rules about 
Intellectual Property, 6. Feedback, 7. Privacy, 8. Identity. 
27  As eBay rules provide for the binding nature of an offer (see 
Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Decision of 14 December 2000 (2 U 58/00), Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2001: 1142; Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 7 
November 2001 (VIII ZR 13/01), NJW 2002: 363; summarised also at 
http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~Lorenz/urteile/njw02_363.htm), thus far sellers 
have not been able to select their buyer. 
28  http://pages.ebay.de/help/tp/unpaid-item-process.html   
29  http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/buyer-requirements.html  
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sanctions: from warnings, the temporary freezing of an account to 
the exclusion of an involved member (formal third-party-control).30 
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the literature 
refers to the regime established by 'eBay' as an autonomous legal 
order (Katsh, Rifkin and Gaitenby, 2000: 705; Baron, 2002; Schultz, 
2005: 27). Although the market place is not located outside the 
state's legal order—especially in Germany numerous judgments 
concerning 'eBay'-transactions have been passed31—courts can only 
partially and indirectly impact on 'eBay's' market order. Recently, 
the German Federal Supreme Court (the 'Bundesgerichtshof') 
decided that in the context of 'eBay'-auctions consumers have a 
right of withdrawal as 'eBay'-auctions are no auctions according to 
section 156 German civil code (the 'BGB'), ie the exception of 
section 312d sec. 4 no. 5 BGB cannot be applied.32 According to 
sections 312d and 355 BGB, the unfounded cancellation of a 
contract is possible at every time even before the dispatch of a 
good; this contradicts the main 'eBay'-principle for buyers, which 
holds that a purchased good generally has to be paid and that an 
unpaid good principally leads to a warning to the buyer due to his 
lack of reliability—all this independently of a right of withdrawal 
granted by the seller.33 Admittedly, 'eBay' cautions no buyer for 
                                                 
30  See § 4 of the user agreement of eBay Germany: 
http://pages.ebay.de/help/policies/user-agreement.html?ssPageName=f:f:DE  
31  An up to date collection of verdicts, including many full texts, can be 
found under: http://www.internetrecht-rostock.de/ebay-und-
internetauktionen.htm.  
32  Bundesgerichtshof, Decision of 3 November 2004 (VIII ZR 375/03), 
JurPC Web-Dok. 281/2004: http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20040281.htm; with 
critical remarks Janal, 2005; critical also Spindler, 2005. 
33  § 9 of the terms of trade of eBay.de: 
http://pages.ebay.de/help/policies/user-agreement.html?ssPageName=f:f:DE; 
see as well: http://pages.ebay.de/help/policies/unpaid-item-process.html. 
Interestingly, the Amtsgericht Bremen, Decision of 20 October 2005 (16 C 
168/O5), recently ruled, that a contractual penalty clause applying in case of an 
unwarranted exercise of a right to rescission (ie item not paid) is not an unfair 
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exercising her right of withdrawal; yet, the latter's immanent 
possibility of misuse by its frequent and arbitrary exercise—
producing high costs for vendors and 'eBay' due to the necessary 
refund of fees for commission and offer—can be tamed via negative 
feed back of the 'eBay'-community. Otherwise, the effect of the 
judgment remains limited to those cases in which German law is 
applicable. Concerning cross-border transactions, German 
consumers can refer to the BGH, yet they might find hardly any 
understanding from the international 'eBay'-community for a 
behaviour that jeopardizes the economic rationale and attraction of 
online auctions and which consequently questions the market order 
fundamentally. In the case of withdrawing an order from an 
American seller, the eBay-'private legal system' might hardly help a 
German consumer to get a refund. 
IV. CIVIL CONSTITUTION: REFLEXIVE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION LAW 
Civil regimes protecting consumers in the field of global e-
commerce have become independent from the legal order of states 
by linking private rule making (codes of conduct) with alternative 
dispute resolution procedures (ODR) and mechanisms of socio-
economic sanctioning (reputation, loss of trustmark, exclusion) and 
enforcement (money-back guarantee, charge back). Since a complex 
variety of such regimes has emerged, we can draw the picture of a 
competition among civil regimes, in which different providers of 
private order compete for the trust of vendors and consumers alike. 
With regard to the substantive consumer protection standards 
applied by such regimes, the 'Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Guidelines' agreed on by the 'Global Business Dialogue on 
                                                                                                                         
business term under the European unfair contract terms directive (93/13/EEC). 
Thus, a buyer who refused to pay for a car he purchased by an auction on eBay 
was ordered to pay damages: http://www.internetrecht-
rostock.de/ebayurteil29.htm. 
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Electronic Commerce' (GBDe) and 'Consumers International' in 
November 2003 read: 
'Applicable Rules: One of the principal reasons why 
business, consumers and governments consider the 
development of ADR systems to be of such strategic 
importance for the enhancement of consumer trust in 
electronic commerce is that such systems can settle 
disputes in an adequate fashion without necessarily 
engaging in cumbersome, costly, and difficult research 
on the detailed legal rules that would have to be applied 
in an official court procedure. […] ADR dispute 
resolution officers may decide in equity and/or on the basis of 
codes of conduct. This flexibility as regards the grounds for 
ADR decisions provides an opportunity for the 
development of high standards of consumer protection 
worldwide.' (GBDe, 2003: 59)  
Accompanying the thus described privatisation of consumer 
contract law, the issue is that consumer contracts are triangularized 
because providers of private order place themselves as 'neutral 
third party' in-between companies and the consumer, which 
renders the latter not only a recipient of goods but also a consumer 
of private legal services (for the arising trinity of potential contractual 
relationships see Hacke, 2001: 31). Here, we deal with reflexive 
consumer contract law in so far as those procedural conditions are 
concerned which render the private generation of substantial 
consumer contract law as fair. The thesis put forward here is that 
the establishment of effective consumer protecting civil regimes 
will factually displace state consumer contract law in particular 
areas of e-commerce, especially in formally organized virtual 
market places. This is why the emerging transnational consumer 
contract law requires an embedding in a procedural constitution of 
freedom, which at the same time enables the privatisation of civil law 
and adds the necessary civilisation to private law.  
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In this respect, the necessary constitutionalization of consumer 
protecting civil regimes has to distinguish between an interior and 
an exterior constitution: the emergence of transnational consumer 
contract law as a legal system is, on the one hand, characterized by 
reflexivity, ie the application of a process to itself (eg, making norms 
on the making of norms, arbitrating over arbitration, self-regulation 
of self-regulation, etc.); hence, societal self-organisation constitutes 
an interior spontaneous constitution of private regimes quasi by itself 
(see Teubner, 2004). On the other hand, private regimes require 
embedding in a public framework that facilitates societal self-
organisation as an exercise of party autonomy and at the same time 
limits it with respect to third party interests and public policy. Here 
the phenomena of normative reflexivity entrenched in private 
regimes as well as their public framework work as mutually 
compensatory constitutional orders. In the context of global 
governance, this renders their boundaries fuzzy. Encompassing the 
collaboration of state, industry, and civil society actors, they appear 
as a hybrid order, (Engel, 2001: 569) which shall be termed as civil 
constitution. 
The establishment of a global civil constitution for transnational 
consumer contract law mainly concerns the justification of reflexive 
institutions, which organize the described phenomena of self-
regulation and private ordering in a way that, on the one hand, 
fosters effective redress through alternative mechanisms of 
consumer protection and, on the other hand, guarantees the 
fairness and justice of such procedures towards consumers and 
businesses. In the following, different approaches for the 
constitutionalization of consumer protecting civil regimes are 
introduced. Although both aspects cannot be sharply 
distinguished, the focus is on the substantial contract law (rights) 
(1) and on the procedural aspects of consumer law (remedies) (2). 
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A. REFLEXIVE TRUSTMARKS: CONTRACTUAL STANDARDS OF 
HYBRID ORGANISATIONS 
Trustmarks are awarded on the basis of a catalogue of criteria 
regularly consolidated in a code of conduct. For the Internet and e-
commerce a plethora of trustmarks is available which on the basis 
of different criteria aim at enhancing the protection of consumers, 
children, and privacy or any combination of these. While, on the 
one hand, it is claimed that the best trustmarks prevail due to the 
invisible hand of competition, it is, on the other hand, feared that 
due to the wide variety of offers consumers could lose overview 
and, hence, that the general trust into the industry could vanish.34 
Certainly, a sound regulatory competition between different 
trustmark schemes only works if consumers are not misled by 
trustmark providers, who apply inferior standards which are not 
sufficiently monitored. 
In order to increase the transparency in the field of trustmarks, the 
notion has emerged that quality requirements should be developed 
in collaboration of states, industry, and consumer associations 
(Nordquist, Andersson and Dzepina, 2002). In so far as the 
compliance with minimum requirements established by co-
regulation is here rewarded with the award of a secondary 
trustmark (trustmark of trustmarks), we deal with a reflexive form of 
self-regulation, which even regulates the conditions for its own 
possibility via self-regulation. Initial approaches to such civil 
constitutions have first been developed at the national level (a). 
From here they can be linked to supranational (b) and global civil 
constitutions (c) via cooperation. 
                                                 
34  For this and the following cf. the report of the Irish EU-Presidency 
presented at the European Consumer Day 2004 Conference 'Building Consumer 
Confidence in the European Online Marketplace, Dublin Castle, 15th March 
2004', p. 8, available at: 
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st09/st09466.en04.pdf 
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1. SECONDARY TRUSTMARKS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
On suggestion of the British government, the 'Alliance for 
Electronic Business' has in collaboration with the 'Consumers' 
Association' founded a consumer protection initiative in the field of 
self-regulation in e-commerce in 1999. Its aim was to fix minimum 
standards in the face of the proliferation of trustmark programs.35 
For it, the non-profit organisation 'TrustUK' has been set up, the 
board of which consists of representatives of the Chambers of 
Commerce and of consumer associations. 'TrustUK' established its 
own trustmark, which is however not directly awarded to vendors. 
As most companies are member of a Chamber of Commerce or of 
an association that binds its members to a code of practice, these 
'code owners' are granted the license for the distribution of the 
trustmark given that their members' codes are in accordance with 
'TrustUK's' minimum requirements. Participating vendors bear 
either the 'TrustUK' label alone or together with the trustmark of 
the 'code owner'; if issues arise consumers have to contact the 'code 
owner' directly. Only if the consumer claims that the latter has not 
settled a dispute in accordance with 'TrustUK's' guidelines, there is 
the possibility to turn to 'TrustUK' directly. Currently, four 'code 
owners' are accredited to 'TrustUK' covering more than 4,000 web 
traders. 
The German initiative 'D21' is a network of political parties, 
enterprises, associations and other institutions ('public private 
partnership'). Its aim is to improve the main conditions for 
Germany to quickly and successfully transit into the information 
and knowledge society.36 In July 2002 members of the initiative 
have agreed on the D21 quality criteria for Internet offers ('D21-
Qualitätskriterien für Internet-Angebote'), which—as amended in 
                                                 
35  www.trustuk.org.uk  
36  www.initiatived21.de  
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200537—put the OECD Guidelines on the basis of European and 
German law in concrete terms; furthermore, the criteria explain and 
amend the latter. Currently, the initiative D21 recommends five 
trustmarks meeting its quality criteria.38 The monitoring and 
further development of these criteria have been transferred to a 
trustmark monitoring board, which apart from representatives of 
participating companies consists of each a representative of the 
ministry of economic affairs, of the federal data protection office 
and of a consumer association ('Verbraucherzentrale 
Bundesverband e.V.') (Föhlisch, 2004). However, such initiatives at 
the national level enhance the transparency of the trustmark market 
to a certain extent, yet due to their gearing to national law they do 
not contribute much to solving issues of cross-border consumer 
contracts (see also Nordquist, Andersson and Dzepina, 2002).  
2. SUPRANATIONAL STANDARDISATION VIA CO-REGULATION? 
With regard to cross-border situations inside the European internal 
market, the question which Member State’s consumer protection 
standards shall apply, in principle, could be answered easily as the 
minimum standards of consumer contract law are established in 
the European acquis communautaire, ie a variety of EC Directives. 
Yet, attempts by the European Commission to unify the contract 
law of the Member States have failed so far, often due to the 
resistance of consumer associations and national governments 
which agreed on a minimum harmonisation of consumer rights, 
but prevented the necessary combination of such measures with 
the 'country of origin'-principle (see also Calliess, 2003). Hence, one 
                                                 
37  Updated version: http://www.internet-
guetesiegel.de/docs/D21_Qualitaetskriterien_2005.pdf  
38  www.internet-guetesiegel.de: Apart from Trusted Shops and among 
others, Euro-Label Deutschland of the EHI (www.shopinfo.net) and S@fer-
Shopping (www.safer-shopping.de) run by the TÜV Süd are part of this 
initiative. 
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could ask whether it would not be a viable alternative to state-
controlled legal harmonisation to generate substantive 'Principles 
of European Consumer Contracts' via self-regulation, for instance 
by developing Europe-wide recommended general contract terms 
(European Commission, 2003: 21 ff., at 4.2), or relating specifically 
to b2c-e-commerce by elaborating a European code of conduct 
which could be applied in cross-border ADR-procedures as 
institutionalized in the EEJ-NET.39 
The European Commission, indeed, aims at such a project in the 
frame of its 'e-confidence' initiative. In its action plan concerning 
'eEurope 2005', the following aims are introduced:  
'Trust and confidence. By end 2003, the Commission, 
together with the private sector, consumer organisations 
and Member States will examine possibilities of 
establishing a European-wide online dispute resolution 
system. To facilitate cross-border electronic transactions 
for SMEs, the Commission will further support the 
establishment of online information systems on legal 
issues. The Commission will work with stakeholders on 
trustmarks requirements with a view to a 
recommendation on consumer confidence in electronic 
commerce.' (European Commission, 2002a: 15) 
In order to prepare such a recommendation, the Commission has 
established an 'e-confidence forum' at the Joint Research Center in 
the year 2000. In this context, a 'drafting group' comprising 
members of industry and consumer associations has drawn up 
'principles for e-commerce codes of conduct'.40 On this basis, the 
European industrial and consumer associations UNICE and BEUC 
                                                 
39  See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/eej_net/index_en.htm  
40  On file with author.  
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have agreed on 'European trustmark requirements' (ETR). For their 
implementation, a committee of association members shall be 
established and an 'e-confidence' web page shall be set up. 
Providers of trustmarks, who want to join this portal, have to pass 
an annual assessment of their compliance with the ETR through an 
independent third party (eg, auditors) (see BEUC/UNICE, 2001). 
Since announcement of the program in October 2001, there have, 
however, been no recognisable steps towards the establishment of 
the system. In November 2004, the Commission finally accepted the 
failure of the initiative and blamed the industry for a lack of 
interest in the implementation of the ETR, especially with regard to 
the financing (see European Commission, 2004). This lack of 
interest may root in the fact that the ETR have been developed by 
association officials who stand more for a traditional industrial 
society than a modern information society. In addition, it remains 
unclear how the ETR could contribute to the problems of cross-
border b2c-e-commerce. In this respect the ETR approach—praised 
by the Commission—is aiming for a race to the top: 
'The ETR offer a basis for good online practice. They do 
not seek to override or replace any mandatory provisions 
at European level. They are supplementary to legal 
obligations and do not affect consumers' statutory rights.' 
(BEUC/UNICE, 2001: 5)41 
In this respect, the ETR accord with consumerists, who demand 
that soft law generated in the process of self-legislation should only 
lead to an increase in the level of protection, but under no 
circumstances to a softening or evasion of those obligatory 
consumer protection regulations in place in a consumer's home 
                                                 
41  Appraisal of the European Commission, 2004: 9: 'The Commission 
Services are of the view that codes such as the ETR are most useful if they 
contain provisions that set an even higher standard of consumer protection than 
the protection offered by legislation.’  
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country (European Consumer Law Group, 2001). Yet, as the ETR 
refers to nationally applicable law in almost all important points, 
they appear strangely anaemic and do neither guide SMEs to those 
regulations they should adopt for Europe-wide sales nor do they 
work as standard for ADR-decisions in consequential conflicts. For 
the problem of EU-wide cross-border b2c-e-commerce is to have 
uniform legal standards which provide the necessary certainty, and 
not just another code like the ETR which merely adds to the 
existing regulatory chaos. One can suspect that the protagonists 
involved with the ETR are too close to the European legislative 
process which does prevent the 'e-confidence' initiative to become 
an independent stimulus for the generation of certainty of the law 
and justice in the internal market. 
At the European level, the 'Euro-Label' system however provides a 
functioning alternative, which has been established due to an 
initiative of the trade association 'EuroCommerce' in 2002.42 'Euro-
Label' is a network of national trustmark providers from Austria, 
Germany, France, Spain, Poland and Italy that awards trustmarks 
on the basis of a common European code of conduct via co-
branding. 'Euro-Label' also handles cross-border complaints against 
its 429 certified shops. If in this way issues cannot be resolved, the 
consumer is referred to the EEJ-Net. The 'European code of 
conduct' is relatively detailed; instead of sweeping references to 
nationally applicable law, it details the concrete rules of the acquis 
communautaire. Concerning withdrawals, for instance, it repeats the 
EU directive on distance contracts, which states that the 
withdrawal period has to be at least seven working days, does not 
commence before prior information and delivery and ceases after 
three months at latest. Certification, though, happens by national 
authorities according to local standards. It cannot be overseen 
whether the European Codex will be of crucial importance beyond 
                                                 
42  www.euro-label.com  
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its function as minimum standard for participating national 
trustmark providers, for instance in the arbitration of cross-border 
disputes. Its wording, however, would render it more apposite 
than the ETR. 
3. GLOBAL LINKAGE 
Already in 2001, the 'Global Business Dialogue on E-Commerce' 
(GBDe) published recommendations concerning trustmarks, 
including both guidelines for trustmark providers and minimum 
standards for the codes of conduct applicable to their online traders 
(GBDe, 2001). Also in 2001, the European umbrella organisation of 
the Chambers of Commerce 'Eurochambres', the mail order firm 
'FEDMA' and the US-American 'BBBOnline' launched the 'Global 
Trustmark Alliance' (GTA) as a common initiative in order to 
further develop and implement global standards. Its aim is to unite 
national and regional trustmark initiatives on the basis of common 
minimum standards under the umbrella of the global GTA 
trustmark, which is intended to be pursued as a co-branding 
endeavour.43 In the meantime, the GTA membership has been 
expanded especially by Asian organisations and on the occasion of 
the annual meeting of the GBDe in November 2004, an 
organisational committee was installed and given the task of 
preparing 'best practices' (GTA, 2004). Given the global reach of the 
GTA initiative and based on OECD guidelines and the 
recommendations of the GBDe, it can be expected that the 
emerging code of conduct will set relevant standards for a 
transnational consumer contract law. 
The involved organisations also intend to cooperate in the handling 
of cross-border disputes. A good example is the cooperation 
agreement on mutual cooperation in cross-border e-commerce 
complaints signed by 'ECOM ADR', a pilot project commissioned 
                                                 
43  See http://www.bbbonline.org/about/press/2001/042301.asp  
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by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 
and operated by Next Generation Electronic Commerce Promotion 
Council of Japan (ECOM),44 and the US Better Business Bureau in 
2002, where complaints from consumers in one country against an 
e-trader situated in the other country are exchanged and both 
organisations work together, if necessary assisting in language 
problems. As of October 2004, 45 complaints from Japanese 
consumers against US-based companies were forwarded from 
ECOM-ADR to BBB-Online, and 22 of these disputes had been 
settled. 12 disputes came to Japan in turn out of which only 2 could 
be settled, while the other cases involved fraud, where eg 
businesses turned out not to exist at all in Japan (Sawada, 2004). 
Although ECOM ADR ceased its operations as of March 2006, the 
quite impressing resolution rate of BBB-Online may be taken as an 
outlook on how a seamless ODR-network for cross-border b2c-e-
commerce might work in the future. Thus, similar cooperation 
agreements have been implemented between 'BBBOnline' and 
trustmark providers from the United Kingdom, which jointly 
created a webpage for cross-border ADR,45 and more recently with 
the Israel-based initiative Public Trust.46 
B. LAW-CONSUMER PROTECTION: ODR STANDARDS AND 
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION 
Set down in Article 6(1) of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 'right 
to a fair trial' is the codification of the citizens' claim to jurisdiction 
directly following from the ban on self-help. The Convention 
frames this claim within the rule of law: 
                                                 
44  See: http://www.ecom.jp/adr/en/index.html; see as well as the outline 
in (Sawada, 2004). 
45  See: http://www.crossborderadr.org/  
46  See: http://www.bbb.org/alerts/article.asp?ID=658  
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In the determination of his civil rights and obligations 
[…], everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be 
pronounced publicly […].47 
The inherent procedural guarantees are not only the kernel of the 
European civil procedure, (Wolf, 2000) they also impact on 
alternative arbitration procedures provided that those are binding 
to the parties involved (Schiavetta, 2004). In this way, the European 
Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that one can give up 
one's right to access to court, yet such renunciation, for instance as 
part of a arbitration clause, is only effective if it is voluntary and 
explicitly expressed. Furthermore, by the judicial review of private 
arbitration tribunals the state remains obliged to guarantee the core 
of fundamental procedural rights, like the right to be heard, judicial 
independence and procedural neutrality (cf. for the jurisdiction 
Schiavetta, 2004). From the vantage point of ODR procedures in the 
field of b2c-e-commerce, these principles are not only in force for 
consumer arbitration in a narrow sense, they can also become 
relevant on the side of companies as they set obligatory and 
binding procedures, like those in the case of 'Online Confidence's' 
arbitration procedure concerning amounts in dispute up to 5,000 
Euro (see Schiavetta, 2004). 
Yet, even if the parties' right to access to court is not limited in any 
way, there is demand for principles concerning the transparency 
and fairness of ODR procedures. Hence, companies, which have 
contractually committed themselves to participate in an online 
mediation procedure if demanded by a customer—like in the 
trustmark programs of 'SquareTrade'—have to be informed in 
advance about procedural conditions. In a similar way, the 
'SquareTrade'-trustmark can only then enhance consumer trust in 
                                                 
47  http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm  
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e-commerce if the consumer is able to form an impression of the 
course of the procedure and of whether it appears to be fair and 
reasonable with respect to the neutrality of mediators, to costs, to 
the promise for the implementation of negotiation results, etc. On 
this matter, providers of ODR procedures can be subject to certain 
pre-contractual obligations to inform customers (Ponte, 2002: 321). 
In order to render the market for ODR services more transparent 
and to establish certain minimum standards of fairness under 
mentioned circumstances, different ODR service providers have (a) 
suggested different measures in order to guarantee compliance 
with these principles (b). 
1. GUIDELINES FOR PROVIDERS OF ODR PROCEDURES 
Initially one has to keep in mind that there exists a number of 
principles for traditional ADR procedures in consumer affairs that 
special guidelines for b2c-e-commerce can build upon: this includes 
the 15 principles of the 'Due Process Protocol for Mediation and 
Arbitration of Consumer Disputes' of 1998. The AAA has made 
compliance with these standards precondition for consumer 
arbitration procedures (for the necessicity to adopt the protocol to 
the Internet see Ponte, 2002a: 441); similarly, it is a precondition for 
the participation in the 'EEJ-Net' to follow the European 
Commission's recommendations concerning dispute settlement 
(98/257/EG) and Mediation (2001/310/EG) in consumer affairs.48 
A first outcome of the consultations on the European Commission’s 
'Green Paper on Alternative Dispute Settlement in Civil and 
Commercial Matters' (2002b) is the 'European Code of Conduct for 
Mediators'49, which contains a number of ethical principles and 
                                                 
48  See: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress/out_of_court/adr_recommendations_e
n.htm  
49  http://www.cto.int/adr/adr_ec_code_conduct_en.pdf   
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which can be adopted by single mediators or institutional 
providers of mediation procedures. 
Based on extensive consultations, the 'Task Force on Electronic 
Commerce and Alternative Dispute Resolution' of the 'American 
Bar Association' (ABA) published 'Recommended Best Practices by 
Online Dispute Resolution Service Providers' in September 2002. 
These are meant as non-binding point of orientation for ODR 
service providers, consumers and trustmark providers and suggest 
that an ODR service provider informs its users about all fairness 
relevant features of a procedure in a transparent way (ABA, 2002). 
In November 2003 the 'Task Force on Consumer Policy for e-
Business' of the 'International Chamber of Commerce' (ICC) has 
published 'Best Practices for Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) in 
b2c and C2C transactions', which contain guidelines both for 
enterprises handling b2c-e-commerce and for ODR service 
providers (ICC, 2003). At the same time, the 'Global Business 
Dialogue on E-Commerce' (GBDe) and 'Consumers International' 
(CI) have agreed on common 'Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Guidelines' for b2c-e-commerce, which contain recommendations 
for enterprises, ODR service providers, and governments (GBDe, 
2003).  
2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF GLOBAL ODR STANDARDS 
To implement the discussed standards for ODR service providers, a 
number of measures have been discussed reaching from self-
regulation to national outline legislation. In this context, the role of 
the state tends to be more emphasized than this is usually the case 
(Schultz, 2003). With respect to transnational consumer contract 
law, the suggested ODR standards touch upon the relationship 
between citizens and the state and, hence, they concern the kernel 
of the law of the constitutional law set down in Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. On the one side, such standards have to be 
developed and spread by institutions that leave no doubt about 
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their neutrality face to conflicting interests and thus enjoy 
unreserved trust of all involved (cf. ABA, 2002: 32 f.; Davis, 2002: 
529). Initiatives for self-regulation, led by industry and commerce 
such as the GBDe or the ICC, do not meet these criteria on their 
own.50 On the other side, ODR standards that have been developed 
with the support of states are advantageous as they can work as 
guideline for judicial review in particular cases. The terms of trade 
of ODR service providers as well as terms of trade clauses 
concerning dispute settlement in consumer contracts cannot easily 
been declared ineffective if they stand in accordance with globally 
accepted ODR standards. 
With the establishment of the European Extra-Judicial Network 
(EEJ-NET) as well as the above mentioned EU-recommendations, 
the European Commission in particular has demonstrated what a 
functioning state organisation at the supranational level could 
contribute. Following this model, the ABA Task Force has 
discussed the set up of a 'Global Dispute Clearing House', which 
would deal with issues arising out of cross-border consumer 
contracts, which consumers could turn to if problems emerge and 
which would be responsible for transferring conflicts to those ODR 
procedures accredited on the basis of global ODR standards. 
Furthermore, it was considered to establish an ODR trustmark, 
which can be awarded to those ODR service providers following 
ODR standards developed by the 'Global Online Standards 
Commission' (ABA, 2002: 27 ff.; cf. Davis, 2002; Schultz, 2004). 
Yet, the ABA Task Force concludes that the ODR market is not 
mature enough in order to already set up binding standards ('not 
one size fits all'). Moreover, an agreement about such standards in a 
                                                 
50  For this reason the GBDe developed its ADR Guidelines in cooperation 
with Consumers International. The Guidelines call for governments to initiate 
'government accreditation' and/or 'government-backed assessment rules’ 
together with industry and consumer representatives, and on a global level only. 
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'Global Online Standards Commission' under international law is 
unlikely due to the apparent divergences, eg, between the USA and 
the EU concerning the authorisation of consumer arbitration 
jurisdiction. Additionally, the accreditation of ODR providers with 
a global ODR trustmark would require substantial financial and 
personal resources, which would be desirable yet seem 
unachievable. In the current situation, for companies it is of prime 
importance to avoid dispute by setting up effective consumer 
complaint procedures ('customer satisfaction systems'). 
Furthermore, as a first step it is suggested to establish an 'i-ADR-
Center', which is given the task of consolidating information about 
available dispute resolution procedures on the web ('low cost, low 
profile'). Without being assessed, ODR provider can initially 
commit themselves to ODR standards such as the ABA Best 
Practices. At first financed by the state, such a centre for 
information could later function as a basis for the more advanced 
notion of a 'Dispute-Clearinghouse' or 'ODR-Trustmark-Centers' 
(ABA, 2002: 31 ff.). 
More than two years after the ABA recommendations have been 
published, however, the suggested 'i-ADR-Center' has not been 
established; presumably no sponsor for the project could be found, 
despite the pursued approach ('low cost, low profile'). Taking the 
EEJ-NET as a blue print, the UN would actually be the right point 
of contact. UNECE has indeed organized conferences concerning 
ODR in 2002 and 2003 in Geneva; in 2004, the third 'UN-Forum on 
Online Dispute Resolution' took place at the University of 
Melbourne in cooperation with UNESCA.51 Due to its chronic lack 
of financing and efficacy, the UN is hardly able to contribute more 
than its name to the development of global ODR standards. The 
organisation of the conferences as well as the publication of the 
results was taken on by academic institutions. For instance, the 
                                                 
51  http://odrforum2004.themediationroom.com/  
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'Center for Information Technology and Dispute Resolution' 
(CITDR) at the University of Massachusetts provides the web site 
www.odr.info, where not only the presentations of the UN-ODR 
forum are published,52 but also broad information is available 
about ODR providers, ODR standards, literature, etc. This actually 
meets the described functions of the 'i-ADR-Center' suggested by 
the ABA Task Force.53 Similar to the Transnational Law Database 
CENTRAL concerning the Lex Mercatoria at the University of 
Cologne, in the area of transnational consumer contract law science 
can play an important part through the systematisation of 
information.54 
Finally, I would like to introduce the model of state incentives that 
combines the compliance with certain standards and the granting 
of legal privileges. Thus, the Act on ADR of North Rhine 
Westphalia couples the accreditation of a mediation institution 
with the advantage of executing a settlement comparable to a court 
ruling, provided compliance with the standards of transparency 
and fairness set forth in the Act.55 During the political debate on the 
so-called Brussels-I-Regulation, the responsible committee of the 
European Parliament suggested that in deviation to Article 17 of 
the Regulation enterprises should be allowed to introduce a choice 
of court clause in consumer contracts if in return they subject 
themselves to an acknowledged out of court dispute settlement 
body (Wallis, 2000). The notion that the state facilitates ADR 
provided compliance with certain minimum conditions of due 
process is well established in international commercial arbitration, 
                                                 
52  http://www.odr.info/unece2003/index.htm  
53  Although the information is not always comprehensive and up to date, 
since ODR.info relies on voluntary contributions mostly by academics. 
54  See eg the Transnational Law Database on the New Law Merchant 
established at the Center for Transnational Law (Professor K P Berger) of the 
University of Cologne: www.tldb.net   
55  The ‚GüSchlG NRW' is available through: 
http://www.streitschlichtung.nrw.de/streit/gesetz.php  
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where arbitral awards corresponding with the requirements 
outlined in the 1958 New York Convention and the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model Law are recognized and enforced by the state 
(Redfern and Hunter, 2004). It seems logical, yet hardly realistic to 
suggest that taking the juridical review of private arbitral awards as 
model, compliance with globally accepted ODR standards could be 
guaranteed by setting up an international public online court, 
where appeals against outcomes of ODR-procedures could be 
lodged (see Schultz, 2003). 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have shown, that the private governance 
mechanisms which have been developed in international commerce 
between merchants in order to tackle opportunism in cross-border 
economic exchange in a situation of constitutional uncertainty, i.e. 
the absence of a world state effectively guaranteeing the protection 
of property rights and the enforcement of contracts, recently have 
successfully been adapted to the new phenomenon of cross-border 
electronic commerce between businesses and consumers. Thus, 
private ordering has proven to be a valuable alternative to state law 
not only in the apolitical domain of merchant law, where 
predominantly coordinative problems arise, but might as well 
contribute to the solution of regulatory problems in the area of 
consumer law, where the protection of weaker parties is at stake. 
One reason for this success is that the protection of consumers is in 
the rational self-interest of businesses which intend to engage in 
cross-border commerce with foreign consumers: In order to 
convince consumers to enter the borderless global retail-market, 
businesses have to invest in building consumer confidence in 
electronic commerce by employing various consumer protecting 
governance mechanisms. Another reason is the emergence of 
businesses which do not engage in the primary markets for 
consumer products and services themselves, but act as market 
makers between other businesses and consumers, and, thus, on a 
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secondary market for private legal services: These intermediaries 
are economically interested in attracting a maximum of sellers as 
well as buyers to participate in their market places. Therefore, it lies 
in their rational self-interest to act as a neutral party towards both 
sides of the market, businesses as well as consumers. Electronic 
market places are, therefore, in a perfect position to effectively 
bundle different private governance mechanisms into what I call 
consumer protecting civil regimes. 
As has been shown in part three of this paper, however, a variety of 
consumer protection concerns remain to be solved. If consumers on 
the electronic world market place are able to choose between 
different consumer protecting civil regimes, there is the need for 
transparency with regard to the offered level of protection as well 
as the effectiveness and fairness of such regimes. In other words 
there is a need for substantive as well as procedural minimum 
standards regarding the private provision of consumer protecting 
services, i.e. ‘law-consumer protection’.  As such standards for the 
border-less character of b2c-e-commerce have to have a truly 
transnational character, they are developed outside the traditional 
international law sphere on the basis of co-regulatory efforts 
between states, industry, and civil society actors.  There can be 
observed a variety of efforts to establish such global minimum 
standards which contribute to the future establishment of a ‘civil 
constitution’ of transnational consumer contract law. 
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